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Book	Review:	My	Enemy’s	Enemy:	India	in
Afghanistan	from	the	Soviet	Invasion	to	the	US
Withdrawal	by	Avinash	Paliwal
In	this	book	review,	Vignesh	Karthik	KR	(PhD	Student,	King’s	College	London)	and	Jeyannathann
Karunanithi	(Political	Analyst,	Chennai,	India)	reflect	on	Avinash	Paliwal’s	My	Enemy’s	Enemy	during	a	time	of
significant	change	for	Afghanistan.	
Avinash	Paliwal.	My	Enemy’s	Enemy:	India	in	Afghanistan	from	the	Soviet	Invasion	to	the	US	Withdrawal.
Oxford	University	Press.	2017.	
On	29	February,	2020	a	landmark	agreement	was	signed	between	the	United	States
of	America	and	the	Taliban	that	was	designed	to	see	the	withdrawal	of	the	majority
of	U.S.	troops	from	Afghanistan.	In	a	recent	New	York	Times	opinion	piece	written
by	Sirajuddin	Haqqani,	the	deputy	leader	of	the	Taliban	argued	that	“We	[The
Taliban]	expect	other	countries	to	respect	the	sovereignty	and	stability	of	our	country
and	consider	it	as	a	ground	for	cooperation	rather	than	competition	and	conflict”.
As	Haqqani’s	statement	implies,	Afghanistan	serves	as	an	invaluable	case	study	for
those	wanting	to	understand	the	place	of	Afghanistan	within	South	Asia	and	the
foreign	policy	maneuvers	of	weak	states	via	global	and	regional	powers	within	the
country.	And	at	this	time	of	political	change	in	Afghanistan,	the	influence	of	countries
from	South	Asia	in	Afghanistan	–	especially	that	of	India’s	–	is	extremely	pertinent.
An	excellent	place	to	begin	in	understanding	what	Haqqani	refers	to	when	he	calls
for	Afghanistan	not	to	be	“a	ground	for	cooperation	rather	than	competition	and
conflict”	is	with	My	Enemy’s	Enemy:	India	in	Afghanistan	from	the	Soviet	Invasion	to
the	US	Withdrawal	(2017)	written	by	Avinash	Paliwal.
India’s	presence	in	Afghanistan	has	been	conspicuous	right	from	King	Zahir	Shah’s	reign	(1933-1973),	through	to
the	Soviet	Invasion	(1979-1989),	and	its	support	for	Ahmed	Shah	Massoud’s	Northern	Alliance	against	Taliban
forces	(1996-2001).	Pakistan	on	the	other	hand	(who	Afghanistan	shares	a	lukewarm	relationship	with	due	to
unresolved	differences	over	the	Durrand	line)	clinched	a	breakthrough	in	the	country	with	support	to	Afghan
Mujahideen	groups	on	behalf	of	the	U.S.	during	the	Soviet	Invasion.
Pakistan’s	role	in	the	victory	of	the	Taliban	in	1996	cannot	be	overlooked.	With	9/11	accelerating	the	U.S.’	action	of
dismantling	the	Taliban	regime,	India	proceeded	to	maintain	links	with	the	Tajik-dominated	Northern	Alliance,	while
throwing	its	weight	behind	Hamid	Karzai.	These	political	maneuvers	were	matched	with	unfettered	investments	by
India,	aimed	at	creating	infrastructure	and	additional	capacity	in	the	war-battered	landscape.	A	few	significant
projects	included	a	road	from	Delaram-Zaranj	and	another	from	Kandahar-Spin	Boldak;	and	perhaps	most
significantly,	the	construction	of	the	Afghan	Parliament.	Such	Indian	investments	were	in	part	made	possible	thanks
to	the	relative	stability	provided	by	the	U.S.’	presence	in	Afghanistan,	which	kept	opposition	forces	in	check.
In	other	words,	India’s	presence	in	Afghanistan	achieved	two	objectives:	firstly,	it	prevented	the	restoration	of	any
form	of	a	resurgent	Taliban	regime	while	seeking	to	limit	Pakistan’s	influence	over	any	emergent	regime	in
Afghanistan;	and	secondly,	it	developed	long-term	diplomatic	ties	and	economic	arrangements	with	a	stable,
popular	and	pro-Indian	regime	in	Afghanistan	(Ganguly	and	Howenstein	2009).	With	the	recent	signing	of	the
agreement	between	the	U.S.	and	Afghanistan,	these	two	Indian	foreign	policy	objectives	in	Afghanistan	have
potentially	been	jeopardised.
Paliwal’s	application	of	the	Advocacy	Coalition	Framework	(ACF)	to	understand	the	political	landscape	of
Afghanistan	serves	as	an	effective	tool	to	unravel	the	proxy	groups	in	Afghanistan	that	negotiate	with	global	and
regional	powers.	The	need	for	such	a	framework	to	interpret	the	complexity	of	the	political	situation	in	Afghanistan
is	necessitated	by	the	dynamic	nature	of	the	political	landscape	across	time	and	space.	Edward	T.	Hall’s	dance
metaphor	of	‘the	perpetual	ballet’	serves	in	Paliwals’	analysis	as	a	useful	concept	to	denote	the	complex	culturo-
geo-political	situation	in	Afghanistan,	dating	back	from	the	‘Great	Game’.
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Paliwal	argues	that	the	foreign	policy	behaviour	of	weak	states	is	not	simply	decided	by	external	systemic	and
regional	factors,	but	rather	is	influenced	by	domestic	factors	–	most	notably	in	this	case	the	influence	of	domestic
Afghan	policy	that	realigns,	evolves	and	responds	to	both	India	and	Pakistan’s	policies	towards	Afghanistan,	thus
balancing	both	factional	and	national	policy	interests.
One	of	Paliwal’s	central	arguments	is	that	while	most	Afghans	would	like	good	relations	with	India,	a	section	of
Afghans	have	preferred	closer	relations	with	Pakistan,	thereby	influencing		Kabul’s	approach	towards	New	Delhi.	In
the	wake	of	the	Taliban’s	emergence,	the	latter	stand	to	gain	more	influence.
This	book	explains	the	trajectory	of	the	relationship	between	India	and	Afghanistan	by	dividing	their	history	into
three	phases:	Debating	Neutrality,	Debating	Containment	and	Debating	Engagement.	In	the	present	context,	with
the	possible	emergence	of	sections	of	the	Taliban	as	legitimate	decision-makers	in	Afghanistan,	revisiting	the
Debating	Containment	phase	is	extremely	useful.	As	explained	in	the	book,	the	Indian	foreign	policy	establishment
can	be	divided	into	two	groups:	Conciliators	and	Partisans.
Paliwal	uses	his	conceptual	framework	(based	on	the	application	of	the	ACF)	to	analyse	the	negotiations	that	took
place	when	the	Indian	Airlines	flight	814	was	hijacked	in	1999.	His	analysis	reveals	the	sub-optimal	outcome	in	the
‘possibility	space’	in	the	negotiations,	due	to	the	anti-engagement	attitude	of	the	foreign	policy	establishment	in
1999,	which	then	saw	the	dominance	of	Partisans.
Partisans	toed	the	line	that	political	factions	at	odds	with	Pakistan	were	allies,	while	those	not	aligned	with	India’s
position	needed	to	be	contained.	This	situation	when	juxtaposed	with	the	Conciliators’	strategy	of	Debating
Neutrality,	when	Indian	intelligence	agencies	were	in	touch	with	those	in	power	as	well	as	the	opposition,	revealed
the	critical	need	for	maintaining	meaningful	contact	with	all	stakeholders.
While	Paliwal	focused	on	the	revival	of	the	strategy	of	Conciliators	to	voice	public	opposition	to	the	Taliban	(while	at
the	same	time	maintaining	discreet	engagement	with	other	faction)	the	present	situation	in	2020	merits	the	need	for
a	strategy	that	rests	on	realpolitik	to	engage	with	various	factions	within	the	Taliban.
It	is	of	concern	to	India	that	Indian	assets	in	Afghanistan	were	targeted	by	the	Haqqani	group,	a	major	Taliban
faction.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	worth	mentioning	that	Taliban	cannot	be	characterised	merely	as	a	jihadi	proxy
created	by	Inter-Services	Intelligence	(ISI).	Instead,	one	can	argue	that	the	formation	of	the	Taliban	is	a	coming
together	of	various	factions	with	different	interests,	and	varying	degrees	of	allegiance,	at	times	non-allegiance,	to
political	and	military	leadership	of	Pakistan.
In	the	2010s,	the	Indian	foreign	policy	establishment	embraced	a	much	more	nuanced	approach	towards	the
Taliban.	The	Conciliators’	strategy	is	now	put	to	the	test	with	the	increasing	political	instability	in	Afghanistan,
despite	the	power-sharing	agreement	signed	on	May	17,	2020	between	Afghan	President	Ashraf	Ghani	and	former
Chief	Executive	Abdullah	Abdullah.	It	is	to	be	noted	that	Abdullah	Abdullah	was	associated	with	the	Northern
Alliance	during	the	war	with	the	Taliban	from	1996-2001.
In	the	present	climate,	the	uneasy	balance	between	Ghani	and	Abdullah	should	be	of	real	concern	to	the
democratic	future	of	the	country,	given	the	conduct	of	parallel	presidential	swearing-in	ceremonies	in	Kabul	on
March	9,	2020,	even	though	Ghani	was	declared	the	winner	of	the	2019	presidential	election	by	the	country’s
Independent	Election	Commission.	Abdullah	raised	doubts	regarding	the	legitimacy	of	the	mandate.
In	the	wake	of	the	apparent	legitimacy	and	sway	secured	by	the	Taliban	through	the	internal	affairs	of	Afghanistan
due	to	the	agreement,	in	the	near	future,	the	trajectory	of	India’s	foreign	policy	towards	Afghanistan	is	likely	to	be
revised.	In	fact,	as	Afghanistan’s	political	future	continues	to	be	written,	books	like	Paliwal’s	serve	as	an	extremely
useful	resource	in	understanding	the	historic	–	as	well	as	many	contemporary	–	regional	pressures	exerted	on	the
country.
Listen	to	Friends,	Enemies	or	just	Neighbours?	The	Afghanistan,	Pakistan	and	India	Triangle,	recorded	on	5	June,
2019.	The	recording	includes	a	contribution	from	author	Avinash	Paliwal.
This	article	gives	the	views	of	the	authors,	and	not	the	position	of	the	South	Asia	@	LSE	blog,	nor	of	the	London
School	of	Economics.	Featured	photo:	Damien	Surgeon,	Flickr,	Creative	Commons,	2.0	Generic	(CC	BY	2.0).
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